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Introduction
The international stock market crash of October 1987 has raised several important questions for financial analysts.
To motivate our contribution, we identify three such questions:
(i) What were the causes of the crash?
(ii) What are the implications of the crash for international market efficiency? (iii) How and why did the stock market crash propagate internationally? Numerous papers and commission reports have attempted to answer these and other questions,1
Briefly, one could summarize the answers provided to the first question as belonging in two categories: macroeconomic and microeconomic causes. Among the macroeconomic causes, the existence of the twin deflcits both in the federal budget and the balance of payments are cited most often. Portfolio insurance, speculative activities in derivative markets, such as futures and options markets, the introduction in the U.S. Congress of a tax bill that would have severely penalized corporate takeovers and leveraged buyouts, and the possible existence of speculative bubbles are listed as candidate microeconomic causes. In a well-documented survey paper, Roll (1989) reviews and critically evaluates some of these answers to the first question and concludes that empiricists have found it difficult to confirm the validity of any of these causes.
Since the first question is so difficult to answer, what can be said about the second? Efficiency in the conventional sense means that security prices, at any time, discount all information then publicly available about subsequent cash flows. This notion of market efficiency has been extended to international mar? kets, whereby world stock market prices reflect all current information of world economic activity. Because the world markets received no obvious new infor? mation in the days immediately preceding the October 19, 1987, international crash, the academic community is challenged to consider the implications of such a crash to the notion of market efficiency. Friedman (1990) surveys some 50 papers that study U.S. market efficiency.
Again, the evidence is mixed. There are numerous approaches that attack market efficiency, but there are also attempts to reconcile observed patterns of stock returns with standard notions of efficient markets. Tables 1 and 2 the appropriate time dimension of the causality analysis is clearly specified. Observe that the dependent variable is indexed by t, which takes the value t or t+ 1 depending upon the time zone shifts of the exchanges.
IV. Tests of Cointegration
It is also important to consider the cointegration among price movements on the different markets.
In effect, Engle and Granger (1987) 
V. Results of Granger Causality Tests
The main results of the Granger causality tests are presented in Table 1 The ao and ao regression coefficients are shown in Table 2 . Little contemporaneous causality is observed for the pre-crash period. However, a substantial increase in contemporaneous causality is detected during and after the month of the crash.
The increase in feedback and contemporaneous causality among the national markets during the month of the crash suggests that the crash started more or less simultaneously in all countries. That is, according to our results, the market crash of October 1987 seems to have been a global crisis of the equity markets all around the world.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
The 
